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Conditionality in social security: lessons from the household duties test  
Dr Jackie Gulland 
Abstract 
Discussions of conditionality and sanctions in benefits policy are usually concerned with 
behavioural conditionality, for example evidence of work-seeking activities. However, 
eligibility rules for benefits also create conditions of entitlement. Failure to meet these 
conditions does not lead to sanctions. Instead, claimants are not entitled to the benefit at all. 
This article discusses the controversial and short-lived ‘Housewives Non-contributory 
Invalidity Pension’ (HNCIP), a non-contributory, non-means-tested, benefit, which was 
available to married and co-habiting women in the UK in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One 
of the eligibility requirements of the benefit was that women had to establish that they were 
‘incapable of normal household duties’. This article draws on archive and other historical 
sources on the introduction, implementation and subsequent abolition of HNCIP to consider 
how this form of conditionality worked in practice. The household duties test for HNCIP was 
discriminatory since it applied to married and co-habiting women, with no such rule for men 
or single women. Although the test appears anachronistic today, it represents a form of 
eligibility conditionality in benefits policy which is sometimes overlooked in the debate on 
conditionality and sanctions. There are three lessons we can learn from this: that category 
conditionality can be as important in excluding people from entitlement to financial support 
as behavioural conditionality; that category conditionality can lead to equally humiliating and 
degrading assessments; and that assumptions about what is ‘normal’ are heavily constructed 
by assumptions about social structures. 






Michael Adler’s new book Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment? Benefit Sanctions in the 
UK describes the development of increasingly harsh sanctions applied to benefit claimants 
who fail to meet tests of work-focussed conditionality in the UK social security system1. 
With this book, Adler joins many recent critics of the sanctions regimes in the UK.2 As Adler 
notes, however, this type of behavioural, work-focussed conditionality is one of three ways in 
which benefits are conditional. Entitlement to benefits is also determined by what Clasen and 
Clegg have described as category and circumstance conditions.3 These conditions are not 
related to the behaviour of claimants but define whether or not a claimant is eligible for a 
benefit in the first place. Circumstance conditions include such elements as means-testing, 
national insurance contributions and citizenship or residence conditions. Category conditions 
on the other hand concern whether or not a claimant fits within a category of entitlement, 
such as being over a certain age, unemployed, or assessed as sufficiently ill or disabled to 
qualify. While recent debates in social security policy have focussed on the problems 
associated with behavioural conditions and their associated sanctions, circumstance and 
category conditions can be equally exclusionary in their effect on claimants. Such conditions 
also carry key messages regarding expectations about claimant behaviour. People who do not 
have sufficient national insurance contributions are not entitled to national insurance benefits. 
People whose household income or capital is over a certain level are not entitled to means-
                                                          
1 M. Adler, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment? Benefit Sanctions in the UK (Basingstoke: Palgrave Pivot, 
2018). 
2 For example P. Dwyer, ‘Punitive and Ineffective: Benefit Sanctions within Social Security’, Journal of Social 
Security Law, 2018, 142–57; P. Dwyer and S. Wright, ‘Universal Credit, Ubiquitous Conditionality and Its 
Implications’, Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, (2014), 22(1), 27–39; B. Watts, and S. Fitzpatrick, Welfare 
Conditionality (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018). 
3 J. Clasen and D. Clegg, ‘Levels and Levers of Conditionality: Measuring Change within Welfare States’, in 
Investigating Welfare State Change: The Dependent Variable Problem in Comparative Analysis, ed. J. Clasen 
and N. Siegel (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007). 




tested benefits. People who have not lived in a particular place for long enough or who fail to 
meet citizenship tests are not entitled to many benefits. 4 Such circumstance conditions may 
seem fair but they systematically exclude certain groups of people, particularly those who 
have been unable to engage in the labour market in their own right or whose citizenship or 
migration status does not fit expectations.  
 
Category conditions are equally exclusionary. Changing definitions of incapacity for work 
are key examples of this. The introduction of Incapacity Benefit in the 1990s, followed by 
Employment and Support Allowance in 2008, involved new definitions of incapacity for 
work and were developed with the specific aim of reducing the number of successful claims. 
As well as being exclusionary, the process of assessment can also be humiliating. This is 
particularly so in assessments of people’s health or disability, which often involve intrusive 
investigations into their daily lives. Recent reports on assessments for Employment and 
Support Allowance and Personal Independence Payments provide evidence of this in today’s 
social security assessments.5 Meanwhile the Scottish Government is attempting to find ways 
of developing assessments which put dignity and respect at the centre of social security 
assessment.6 
 
                                                          
4 For a discussion of how these conditions interact with other forms of conditionality, see I. Shutes,‘Work-
Related Conditionality and the Access to Social Benefits of National Citizens, EU and Non-EU Citizens’, Journal 
of Social Policy, (2016), 45, 691–707; C. Barnard and A. Ludlow, ‘“Undeserving” EU Migrants “Milking Britain’s 
Benefits”? EU Citizens before Social Security Tribunals’, Public Law, (2019), 260–80; C. O’Brien, Unity in 
Adversity: EU Citizenship, Social Justice and the Cautionary Tale of the UK, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017). 
5 See for example House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, PIP and ESA Assessments: Claimant 
Experiences Fourth Report of Session 2017-19 HC355, (2018) 
6M. Simpson, G. McKeever and A. Gray ‘From Principles to Practice: Social Security in the Scottish Laboratory 
of Democracy’, Journal of Social Security Law, 26 (2019), 13–31. 
  




These social security developments are at the forefront of debate today but we can also find 
examples of exclusionary entitlement conditions and humiliating assessment processes in the 
past. This article looks at the particular example of a short-lived benefit aimed specifically at 
married and cohabiting women in the late 1970s and early 1980s: Housewives Non-
Contributory Invalidity Pension (HNCIP), which included a specific test of capacity for 
‘normal household duties’, a vague and intrusive test of women’s capacity for cooking, 
cleaning and other household tasks.  Although the test appears anachronistic today, it 
illustrates how eligibility criteria can create exclusionary and demeaning conditions for 
benefits claimants. 
Methods 
This paper is based on an analysis of documentary sources from the 1970s and 1980s, some 
of which were published at the time and others which are in the National Archives in London. 
Sources include National Insurance Commissioners’ decisions, civil service files and reports 
published by Government and third sector organisations. These include the civil service files 
regarding key Commissioners’ Decisions in 1978 and proposals to replace HNCIP with 
Severe Disablement Allowance in the 1980s. My analysis of these documents involves 
looking through the lense of gender and critical disability studies. Feminist scholars have 
long noted the gendered division of labour in the home and in the workplace and the way in 
which the social security system both reflects and supports this.7 HNCIP provides a 
particularly stark example of this and, although its discriminatory nature was recognised at 
the time of its implementation, it is helpful to continue to consider the assumptions behind 
HNCIP from a gender perspective. Insights from critical disability studies enable us to see 
                                                          
7 For example, M. Daly and K. Rake, Gender and the Welfare State (Oxford: Polity, 2003); J. Lewis, Work–Family 
Balance, Gender and Policy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009); R. Lister, ‘“She Has Other Duties” - 
Women, Citizenship and Social Security’, in Social Security and Social Change: New Challenges to the Beveridge 
Model, ed. by S. Baldwin and J. Falkingham (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994); A. Oakley, The 
Sociology of Housework (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1974). 




how social security systems construct disability within an individualised, medical model, 
where the focus is on claimants’ individual impairments and loss of function, compared to a 
social model of disability which would look instead at the structural barriers which create 
disability.8 Social security systems are inherently individualised since they require that 
claimants demonstrate their personal limitations, often with little regard to the structural 
barriers which exclude people from the workplace or from full participation in society. In 
relation to social security, disability studies scholars have questioned the normalisation of 
‘work’ as the basis of entitlement.9 A disability studies approach enables us to consider 
HNCIP by looking at the assumptions made about disabled people in its design and 
implementation. 
Background to HNCIP 
 
Housewives Non-contributory Invalidity Pension (HNCIP) was developed as part of a 
programme of expansion in benefits for disabled people in the 1970s, which included the 
introduction of Attendance Allowance, carers’ benefits and more generous payments for 
Invalidity Benefit.10 Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension (NCIP) was introduced through the 
Social Security Act 1975 and was aimed at disabled people who were unable to work but who 
did not have sufficient national insurance contributions to qualify for the mainstream 
Invalidity Benefit. NCIP was targeted at people who had been disabled since their youth and 
had never had the chance to be in paid employment. This benefit provides an example of a 
                                                          
8 First described in this way by M. Oliver, Understanding Disability from Theory to Practice (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1996); For a more recent discussion of thinking on different models of disability, see J. Grue, 
Disability and Discourse Analysis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015). 
9 For example, C. Barnes, ‘Re-Thinking Disability, Work and Welfare’, Sociology Compass, 6 (2012), 472–84  
10 For details see A. Borsay, Disability and Social Policy in Britain since 1750: A History of Exclusion (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); N. Harris, ‘Beveridge and Beyond: The Shift from Insurance to Means-Testing’, in 
Social Security Law in Context, ed. N. Harris, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); S. Shah, and M. Priestley, 
Disability and Social Change: Private Lives and Public Policies. (Bristol: Policy Press, 2011). 




widening of the ‘circumstance’ conditions for incapacity benefits although it was paid at two-
thirds of the rate paid for mainstream out of work benefits. 
The main Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension (NCIP) was payable only to men and to single 
women. Policy makers at the time believed that such a benefit should not be payable to 
married women, since it was considered that married women would not be in the labour 
market as their ‘normal job is in the home’.11 On the basis that married women’s role was to 
do ‘household work’, they could only qualify for the new benefit, if they could show that they 
were incapable of paid work and that they were incapable of household duties.12  
When NCIP was introduced in the Social Security Act 1975, women were excluded from 
eligibility for the main NCIP if they were married, cohabiting with a man, or if they were 
separated and supported financially by a man, unless they were ‘incapable of performing 
normal household duties.13 The definition of this phrase was to be provided in regulations. 
Payments under this section became known as Housewives Non-Contributory Invalidity 
Pension or HNCIP. The term ‘Housewives’ did not appear in the legislation but the benefit 
was widely known by this name, including on civil service documents and claim forms (Form 
BF 450). A Government leaflet about the scheme had the title ‘HNCIP a pension for disabled 
married women who can't carry out household tasks.14 The term HNCIP was also used to 
describe the administration of the benefit, with an ‘HNCIP Unit’ in Newcastle.15 It is not 
clear how the term ‘Housewives’ was added to the name. The specific qualifying rules (or in 
fact disqualifying rules for NCIP) were that the claimants were women and that they were 
married to, cohabiting with, or supported by men. The rules did not require that they were 
                                                          
11 House of Commons, Social Security Act 1973. Social Security Provision for Chronically Sick and Disabled 
People (London: HMSO, 1974), para 43. 
12 Ibid, para 43 
13 Social Security Act 1975, 36(2) 
14 Leaflet NI.214, Nov 1983 
15 referred to in documents in National Archives file PIN 15/4483 




‘housewives’. However, the use of this term in official discourse carried an important 
message that married and cohabiting women were expected to be housewives. The inclusion 
of women who were cohabiting or who were separated but financially supported by men, is 
evidence that policy makers made assumptions about all women’s financial dependence on 
men, even when they were not married or when marriages had broken down.16 
HNCIP was controversial from the outset, with women’s groups, poverty campaigners and 
disability groups protesting at its discriminatory presumptions.17 Disability and women’s 
rights groups joined together to form ‘The Equal Rights for Disabled Women Campaign', to 
highlight the discriminatory nature of the benefit.18 This organisation funded Loach and 
Lister to carry out research on HNCIP in 1978. Using evidence of women’s employment 
patterns at the time, Loach and Lister claimed that the assumption that married women were 
primarily housewives was 'wholly anachronistic in comparison with the employment patterns 
of married women today’. 19 They concluded that 'The ability of a married woman to do the 
housework should therefore be of no more relevance to her claim for NCIP than the ability of 
a man or a single woman to do housework'.20 The National Insurance Advisory Committee 
also noted, in its report on the implementation of the legislation in 1977, that most of the 
organisations who had commented on the benefit had pointed out its discriminatory nature 
and had recommended that married women should qualify for NCIP on the same basis as 
                                                          
16 The cohabitation rule in means-tested benefits and for widows’ benefits has long been a matter of concern 
to feminist commentators, see R. Lister, As man and wife? : A study of the cohabitation rule (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1973). For a more recent discussion, see S. Kelly, Understanding Co-Habitation: A 
Critical Study of the Living Together as Husband and Wife Rule in UK Social Security Law (Edinburgh, Centre for 
Research on Families and Relationships, 2008) <https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/2769> For the legal 
position in 1978, see A. Ogus and E. Barendt, The Law of Social Security (London: Butterworths, 1978).  
17 I. Loach and R. Lister, Second Class Disabled - a Report on the Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension for Married 
Women (London: Equal Rights for Disabled Women Campaign, 1978); National Insurance Advisory Committee, 
Social Security Act 1975, Social Security (Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension) Amendment Regulations 1977 
(S.I. 1977 No. 1312). Report of the National Insurance Advisory Committee (London: HMSO, 1977). 
18 M. Hyman, ‘Housewives’ Non-contributory Invalidity Pension: the case for the abolition of the Household 
Duties Test in the United Kingdom’, International Social Security Review, 35 (1982), 319–32  
19 Loach and Lister, p21 
20 Loach and Lister p27 




men and single women. However the Committee’s remit did not include the possibility of 
recommending this and so the focus was on implementation only.21 Loach and Lister had also 
noted in their report in 1978 that, although their main objection to the household duties test 
was its inherently discriminatory nature, it was also ‘an impossible test’.22 Despite the 
objections from women’s groups and disability organisations, it was this practical 
implementation of the test which produced the real challenge to policy makers and legal 
decision makers and of course to claimants themselves. 
The real world of the household duties test 
The Social Security Act 1975 required that claimants must be ‘incapable of performing 
normal household duties’.23 Regulations refined this by requiring that the claimants were 
‘unable to perform to any substantial extent, or cannot reasonably be expected to perform to 
any substantial extent, normal household duties’.24 This expansion of the definition took 
account of criticism that the wording in the 1975 Act would exclude almost everyone.25 
‘Normal household duties’ was not defined. Subsequent case law and amendments to the 
wording of the regulation demonstrated the difficulty of interpretation, as we shall see below. 
In the meantime, policy makers and those at the frontline of decision making had to find a 
way of interpreting what ‘normal household duties’ might mean in practice. Social security 
decision makers had struggled with assessing women's capacity for unpaid household work 
during the inter-war and early post-war periods of social security. During these times 
attempts had been made to exclude women from national insurance sickness benefits if they 
                                                          
21 National Insurance Advisory Committee, Social Security Act 1975, Social Security (Non-Contributory 
Invalidity Pension) Amendment Regulations 1977 (S.I. 1977 No. 1312). Report of the National Insurance 
Advisory Committee (London: HMSO, 1977), p 5. 
22 Loach and Lister 1978, p30 
23 Social Security Act 1975, 36(2)(b) 
24 Social Security Non-contributory Invalidity Pension (Amendment) Regulations 1977, Reg 13A 
25 National Insurance Advisory Committee, Social Security Act 1975, Social Security (Non-Contributory 
Invalidity Pension) Amendment Regulations 1977 (S.I. 1977 No. 1312). Report of the National Insurance 
Advisory Committee (London: HMSO, 1977), p 9. 




were able to carry out domestic work at home and legal decision makers had found this very 
difficult to define in practice.26 The difficulties of these earlier periods had perhaps been 
forgotten by the 1970s and similar problems soon emerged. 
Claims for HNCIP were decided by an insurance officer based in the Department of Health 
and Social Security, on the basis of evidence provided by the claimant on the original claim 
form and by her GP. GP evidence included a medical certificate confirming that the claimant 
was incapable of work and an additional form relating to the household duties test. DHSS 
guidance to GPs expected that this would sometimes require a visit to the claimant’s home to 
assess her capacity for household tasks.27 
The claim form for the benefit (BF450)28 ran to several pages, which may seem short by 
today’s standards but was longer than the equivalent claim form for NCIP or Sickness or 
Invalidity Benefit at the time, which required only a medical certificate of incapacity for 
work. The HNCIP claim form was in three parts. The first contained questions about the 
claimant’s personal details, while the second contained a series of questions about the 
claimant's accommodation, with the explanation that the questions were 'designed to help you 
describe the difficulties you have in doing your household work'. The third part of the form 
contained tick boxes listing a range of household tasks under the headings: ‘shopping’, 
'meals', ‘washing and ironing’, ‘cleaning’ and 'general'. The heading 'general' had questions 
regarding making beds and ‘dealing with tradespeople’. There were no questions about child 
care or household work relating to children, although a question in part two, asking for details 
of ‘others in the household’ might suggest that more shopping, cooking and cleaning would 
                                                          
26 For a detailed discussion of the issue of women’s domestic work in these earlier sickness benefits schemes, 
see J. Gulland, Gender, Work and Social Control: A Century of Disability Benefits (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2019) 
27 DHSS Notes for medical practitioners who are asked to examine married women who have claimed Non-
Contributory Invalidity Pension. Form HA46, filed in PIN 35/657 
28 Claim form BF450, copy in PIN 35/657 




be required if there were children or other adults to support. These questions on the claim 
form were based on an assumption that it was possible to imagine what ‘normal’ household 
duties might be, while the questions about the type of house and other members of the 
household were an attempt to understand what the range of duties might be in the case of the 
individual claimant. It was noted in a later Commissioner’s Decision that the questions on the 
form were not based on any definition in the legislation but that they were aimed at an 
assessment of ‘normal household duties’.29 
Part two of the form also asked questions designed to find out the extent to which the 
claimant was assisted in these household duties by other members of her family. The question 
was framed as: 
‘because of your condition do you get any help with the household jobs from 
members of your family or from anyone else?' (q17).  
It is useful to consider the wording here. The phrase ‘because of your condition’ placed the 
assessment firmly in the medical model of disability, focussing on the claimant’s ‘condition’ 
and the limitations which this created. The clear assumption here was that all married and 
cohabiting women had sole responsibility for the housework and that any ‘help’ they received 
was the result of their ‘condition’ rather than any sharing of household tasks within the wider 
family unit. We can see this in guidance to General Practitioners. The GP’s form focussed the 
questions more specifically on functional abilities such as 'lifting, 'carrying, reaching, 
bending, walking within the home, walking outside the home, planning and 
communication.30 The guidance stated that the assessment of a woman's capacities should 
take account of 'the size and composition of her family', including young children or elderly 
relatives, 'the size and nature of the accommodation' and the 'availability of appliances and 
                                                          
29 R(S)5/78 para 9 
30 Form HA45 copy in PIN 35/657 




aids to ease the burden'. Commentators noted that the meaning of ‘appliances and aids’ was 
particularly confusing since it was not clear what these might be or how the use of them 
might make a difference to the claim. Loach and Lister cite several examples of this, 
including the example of a Mrs N who had an arm amputation and had difficulty carrying out 
cooking and housework. Mrs N had created her own gadget for chopping vegetables, a 
wooden board with nails which allowed her to position potatoes so that she could chop them 
with one hand. She also explained that she could do the hoovering by carrying the hoover 
flex between her teeth. Mrs N had been found capable of household duties but this decision 
had been overturned at appeal.31 Loach and Lister report considerable confusion amongst 
claimants as to whether such items as Mrs N’s homemade gadgets or automatic washing 
machines and other household equipment counted as ‘specialist’.  
 
The presence or absence of others in the household, who might take on some of the 
responsibility for household work, was equally confusing. The guidance to doctors said: 
The authorities have to decide how much of the normal work the claimant herself can 
do, not how far other people in the household can substitute for her. For example, 
although it might be reasonable to expect an adolescent daughter to keep her own 
bedroom tidy, cooking for the family should be seen as being the housewife’s; not the 
daughter’s responsibility. 32 
This attempt to distinguish between the ‘duties’ of the claimant and ‘help’ that others might 
provide was based on an imaginary housewife whose duties were clear to all concerned. 
There was no mention of adolescent sons or husbands who might be responsible for keeping 
                                                          
31 I. Loach and R. Lister, Second Class Disabled - a Report on the Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension for Married 
Women (London: Equal Rights for Disabled Women Campaign, 1978), p70. 
32 para 5 Form HA 46 copy in PIN 35/657 




their own rooms tidy or contributing to the household work. The use of language that married 
women were automatically housewives or that unpaid household work, which they might or 
might not do, was their ‘duty’ implied a particular construction of family life. This point was 
made by Loach and Lister in the recommendations from their report in 1978, in which they 
recommended the abolition of the test altogether. At the very least, they argued, this language 
should be amended to describe household work as ‘tasks’ or ‘jobs’ rather than ‘duties’.33 
Loach and Lister’s report also found that women found the test humiliating and distressing. 
Women who had previously held a wide range of professional and other technically 
demanding jobs were astonished to discover that their eligibility for benefit should be based 
on their ability to clean or dust. Some found this humiliating because they felt that it insulted 
their previous educational or work experience, while others noted that they may have been 
able to work in jobs which did not require physical strength and that housework was quite 
different. Loach and Lister describe the test as ‘insultingly inappropriate’ giving the example 
of a ‘Mrs K’ who had previously worked in a hospital lab ‘which used my mental powers and 
not brute strength’ and that ‘My main job was the one in the Hospital, for which I was highly 
trained; and it should not be assumed that my main purpose in life is to do housework’.34 
While some women in the nineteen-seventies might have considered that they were 
‘housewives’, the assumption that this was automatic by virtue of their gender and marital or 
cohabiting status was unacceptable for many claimants. 
 
The practicalities of the household duties test brought further humiliations in the detail which 
women were required to provide in order to qualify. A revealing case from 1981 concerned a 
                                                          
33 Loach and Lister, p81 
34 Loach and Lister, p25 




woman, described as ‘of Indian origin’ and as maintaining ‘an Indian style of living’35. The 
claimant was fifty-nine, married and living with an adult son, who gave evidence on her 
behalf at the hearing as she did not speak English. She had claimed and been refused benefit 
and that decision had been confirmed by a first-tier tribunal. She then appealed to the 
Commissioner. The Commissioner’s decision described her health issues in some detail along 
with details of her household and her extended family, including another son and his wife and 
a daughter and her husband and several grandchildren. Only one of her adult children lived 
with her but the others contributed to the household tasks. The decision referred to the ‘labour 
intensive’ requirements of the claimant’s cultural expectations in cooking and laundry, with 
detailed explanation of a typical ‘Indian’ meal and the complexities of washing and drying 
saris. Detailed evidence of recent accidents was provided by the claimant’s son, including 
when she fell while trying to lay the table, had caught her sari in the gas cooker or burning 
her fingers while cooking. The Commissioner showed considerable understanding of the 
claimant’s cultural expectations, stating that the typical meals of the claimant’s household 
would not contain ‘frozen and/or ready to use ingredients which so much lighten the burden 
of most English housewives’.36 The Commissioner agreed that using these convenience foods 
would not be acceptable to this particular claimant. The Commissioner pondered what would 
happen if the claimant had to manage the household on her own, concluding that her family 
‘would never want for a cup of tea and could eat uncooked chapatti dough’ and that this 
meant that the claimant was not capable of household duties. This case is an example of a 
National Insurance Commissioner going to considerable lengths to understand the day-to-day 
life of the claimant, although necessitating considerable detail of her private life and 
perceived failings as a housewife. 
                                                          
35 R(S)11/81, para 3 
36 Ibid para 9. 




We can compare this case with a claimant in another case who was advised that she could 
‘open tins’, put washing in the washing machine and go shopping with her husband. The 
woman was thirty seven and had health issues which led to her experiencing exhaustion after 
any effort. Her local authority had provided her with a home help to assist with the heavier 
domestic work but this was not considered to be evidence in itself of the claimant’s 
incapacity. She was able to do some ‘limited’ shopping locally but did most of the shopping 
at the weekend when her husband was available to drive. The Commissioner considered that 
she was ‘capable of exercising an overall supervision and direction of the assistance she 
receives’.37 In this case the claimant was found to be capable of household duties. I cite these 
two cases, not because the careful consideration given to the claimant in R(S)11/81 was 
excessive but because it demonstrates the lengths to which claimants and their families were 
required to provide intimate details of their health, daily lives and relationships with family 
members in order to qualify for HNCIP. 
Appeals 
Refusals of HNCIP ran at around 40% of claims in the years between 1978 and 1982, leading 
to a high volume of appeals. In 1978, 90% of those disallowed benefit appealed against the 
decision, although that proportion fell to around 30% by 1983.38 Success rates on appeal ran 
at around 40%.39 By 1978 the complexities of interpreting the household duties test led to a 
key decision by the National Insurance Commissioners: R(S)7/78. The controversy prompted 
by R(S)7/78 was described by Prosser as ‘one of the most important test cases ever brought in 
                                                          
37 R(S) 7/79, para 11 
38 Although such high levels of appeal are common today, this was considered unusually high at the time, C. 
Glendinning, ‘After Working All These Years’: A Response to the Report of the National Insurance Advisory 
Committee on the ‘Household Duties’ Test for Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension for Married Women 
(London: Disability Alliance, 1980), p31. 
39 statistics on HNCIP appeals from PIN 35/657 




social welfare law’.40 The history of this case began with R(S)5/78, concerning a Mrs M who 
had claimed HNCIP, was refused and had then appealed successfully to a local tribunal. Mrs 
M was a married woman in her forties who had been disabled since birth, with an impairment 
causing paralysis of her right hand side. The local tribunal had found that she was incapable 
of household duties. The local insurance office appealed against this decision to the National 
Insurance Commissioner and the case was considered so important to stakeholders that the 
hearing was attended by observers from the Disablement Income Group (DIG) and the 
DHSS, along with reporters from The Guardian, The Times and The Manchester Evening 
News. Papers relating to R(S)5/78 are in the National Archives and provide us with some 
further detail of what happened at the hearing.41  
The reported decision on the case, which gives considerable detail of Mrs M’s health and the 
daily routines of her life, is itself revealing of the intrusion required in making a decision on a 
woman’s capacity for household duties. The DIG account of what happened at her hearing, 
provides a more detailed description of the intrusive questioning regarding her health, the 
detailed layout of her house, the type of cooker and saucepans that she used. She was asked if 
she could not use 'convenience foods’ and whether 'jacket potatoes' would save her from 
having to peel them. The DIG reporter concluded that ‘The hearing seemed interminable and 
I doubt anyone less 'tough' than Mrs M would have stood it - particularly the deliberations 
over the word 'substantial; during which Mrs M was discussed almost as an inanimate 
object’. 42 
The DHSS observer was much more sceptical of Mrs M’s authenticity, observing among 
other things that ‘She gave no satisfactory full explanation of how she spent her time most 
                                                          
40 T. Prosser, Test Cases for the Poor: Legal Techniques in the Politics of Social Welfare (London: Child Poverty 
Action Group, 1983), p73 
41 Papers in PIN 35/491 
42 Report by Rosemary Till of DIG of the hearing of Mrs M, p1, copy filed in PIN 35/491 




days’ and that 'when she resumed her seat, she did so without the slightest difficulty and with 
very sure movements of her left hand and legs'.43 The Commissioner, however, described 
Mrs M as a ‘candid witness who did not exaggerate her difficulties’ and found that she met 
the requirements for the household duties test and so was entitled to benefit.44  
Apart from the details of Mrs M’s life, the legal argument concerned the interpretation of the 
meaning of the household duties test and what was meant by being unable ‘to perform to any 
substantial extent… normal household duties’45. The Commissioner recognised that ‘normal’ 
would mean different things for different people, noting that: 
Since households vary in their composition, facilities and environment the normal 
household duties of one household may well include duties which do not arise for 
another, although basic household duties are in large measure common to both. 46 
While the insurance officer had argued that what Mrs M could do was normal for her, the 
Commissioner noted that this was a circular argument which would lead to no-one qualifying 
for benefit: 
The greater the incapacity the less can be done; a claimant, whose incapacity was 
almost total and whose only household duty, for which she had a slight impairment of 
function, was for instance dusting from her wheelchair, would fail on the ground that 
she performed her normal household duty to a substantial extent. Such a result seems 
to me to be incongruous and wrong. 47 
The Commissioner decided that he had to consider the extent to which she could perform 
normal household duties in the sense of ‘the claimant's own household, in relation to the 
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duties therein which a capable housewife would perform’ and whether her limitations were 
‘substantial’. He concluded that Mrs M’s limitations were substantial and that she, therefore, 
qualified for benefit. 
Following this decision the next case due to be heard by the Commissioners was referred to a 
tribunal of Commissioners in order to establish clear case law on the matter. This decision 
was reported as R(S)7/78 and considered similar matters to those in R(S)5/78. The claimant, 
Mrs T, was a woman aged fifty-four, who had become disabled in her late forties. The 
tribunal of Commissioners agreed with R(S)5/78 that the key focus of the test was what a 
woman could not do, rather than what she could do and rejected the proposition put forward 
by the DHSS that claims should succeed only when ‘there are virtually no household duties 
she can perform’. Instead they argued that the meaning of regulation was: 
‘by reason of her disablement she is effectively prevented from running her household 
in the manner to be expected of a housewife in her circumstances, and to maintain it 
to the standard appropriate to such circumstances’. 48 
The Commissioners concluded that this had been satisfied by Mrs T and that she was entitled 
to benefit. The DHSS was concerned that this interpretation of the test would lead to a huge 
increase in successful claims and brought in amending regulations immediately to try and 
prevent this surge in claims. The new regulations required that a woman would have to 
establish that: 
‘she cannot perform such duties to any substantial extent’ and that she would not be 
entitled if ‘she can reasonably be expected to perform such duties to any substantial 
extent’.49  
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This apparently subtle change in wording changed the emphasis by requiring decision makers 
to look at what a woman could do as well as what she could not. The decision was reported 
on 8th September and the regulations were introduced within days, on 12th September, leading 
to immediate criticism. The public and political protest regarding the revised regulations led 
to a National Insurance Advisory Committee report with the remit of considering ‘alternative 
ways to … prescribe the circumstances in which a woman is or is not to be treated as 
incapable of performing normal household duties’.50 
The NIAC report outlined the considerable difficulties with HNCIP and the difficulties of 
formulating and applying a household duties test: 
‘Our consideration of this question and the volume and quantity of the representations 
we have received have impressed upon us the widespread dissatisfaction which exists 
about the household duties test. It seems to us that whatever the arguments for 
applying a special test of this kind to married women in the past, these arguments 
must inevitably grow weaker in the future as employment outside the home becomes 
more and more the norm for married women.51 
It concluded that the DHSS should consider introducing a revised test based on ‘normal 
activity’ for both male and female claimants or phasing out the household duties test 
altogether. However, the remit of the inquiry did not permit such recommendations and 
instead the report recommended only ‘monitoring very carefully the working of the rules’, 
minimising administrative difficulties and avoiding distress to claimants.52  
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The end of HNCIP 
Further political lobbying and research by organisations such as the Disability Alliance 
continued into the early 1980s, continuing to highlight the discriminatory nature of the test as 
well as the practical difficulties of implementing it.53 Yet another report by the DHSS in 1983 
considered how the household duties test could be revised or abolished. The narrative in this 
report of the history of the benefit up until that point is illuminating in its view of what the 
benefit had been about and what the case law had done with it: 
The original intention was to restrict payment of NCIP to what were seen as potential 
breadwinners only, and to exclude married women on the grounds that they would not 
normally be in employment. It was not considered practicable or justifiable to seek to 
distinguish those married women who would have been working outside the home but 
for their disablement.54  
The report went on to consider whether the test was indeed discriminatory and concluded that 
there were three different categories of women who might potentially qualify for HNCIP, 
distinguishing between ‘Congenitally disabled married women’ who had been unable to build 
up a record of work and national insurance contributions and who were therefore deserving of 
support through a non-contributory benefit , ‘Married women, disabled whilst of working age 
with a previous work record’, whom it argued were not deserving of benefit because they had 
chosen [sic] not to work full time or not to pay the full rate of contributions, and ‘married 
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women disabled whilst of working age with no previous work record’, whom it argued were 
deserving of benefit so long as they could pass the household duties test.55  
What is illuminating for the purposes of this article is that the report perceived a clear 
differentiation between ‘deserving’ disabled women who had never had the chance to work, 
undeserving disabled women who had chosen to work but not to pay full national insurance 
contributions and deserving disabled women who had chosen marriage and housework as a 
career but were unable to fulfil their duties in this career. This imaginary differentiation 
between different groups of women made a clear distinction between those who were 
deserving of benefit and those who were not, based on assumptions about disabled women’s 
life choices. The report concluded that, although this distinction existed it was not practical to 
create a test which would differentiate between them in practice. The solution recommended 
by the report was to introduce instead a gender neutral, and therefore, they argued, non-
discriminatory, test which would allow ‘an objective test' which would assess disablement 
rather than loss of function’, based on the existing tests of disablement in the war pensions 
and industrial injuries schemes.56 Significantly, the level of disablement considered 
appropriate to qualify for this new benefit was not based on any objective or neutral 
assessment of what would be a sensible level to apply but on how to get the number of 
successful claims to about the same level as the household duties test was producing. The 
report estimated that at a test of ‘80% disability’, 55,000 women would qualify and 
concluded therefore that an 80% test would produce about the right number of successful 
claims. 57  
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Severe Disablement Allowance 
 
The eventual demise of HNCIP came about as a result of a combination of these legal test 
cases and the introduction of European Equal Treatment rules, confirming its discriminatory 
nature.58 A replacement benefit, Severe Disablement Allowance (SDA)59, was introduced by 
the Health and Social Security Act 1984 and was payable to people who had been unable to 
accumulate sufficient national insurance contributions for Invalidity Benefit, who had been 
incapable of work for 196 days and who: 
 
suffers from loss of physical or mental faculty such that the assessed extent of the 
resulting disablement amounts to not less than 80 per cent.60  
 
An exemption from the 80 per cent rule was applied to people who had been continuously 
incapable of work since before the age of 20.61 This exemption was an attempt to make the 
benefit available to disabled people who had never had the opportunity to enter the labour 
market who were considered more deserving than those who might have made choices about 
their contributions to the National Insurance scheme. This was a clear reflection of the first 
category of ‘deserving’ disabled women, referred to in the 1983 report on HNCIP, although 
now applied to both men and women. The rules for SDA, were criticised at the time for being 
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potentially indirectly discriminatory. 62 When subsequently challenged they were found to be 
in contravention of the Equal Treatment Directive.63 
 
SDA itself was abolished in 2000 and replaced by a category of contributory Incapacity 
Benefit which allowed young people to qualify without the contribution requirement. Other 
people claiming Incapacity Benefit had to meet the national insurance contribution 
conditions, thus excluding people without a regular connection with the labour market who 
became impaired later in life. Married women, whose labour market participation was 
disrupted by childcare or other gendered expectations, would be particularly affected by the 
end of SDA.64 The exception for young people was carried over from Incapacity Benefit to 
ESA but has also now been abolished so that those who have insufficient national insurance 
contributions are restricted to means-tested ESA or Universal Credit.65 There is still 
continuing entitlement to SDA for those who claimed before it was abolished, although the 
numbers are declining, with claims standing at 23,000 in February 2018.66 An interesting 
footnote to the history of this benefit is that responsibility for SDA continuing claims in 
Scotland was devolved to the Scottish Parliament as part of the devolution of some social 
security benefits in the Scotland Act 2016. SDA stands out as an anomaly in the devolved 
benefits as the only benefit for incapacity for work which was devolved. It is possible that it 
was devolved in error, resulting from the confusion in names of different types of disability 
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benefits.67 The Scottish Government has said that it will not make use of its powers to amend 
the benefit, recognising that there would be little point.68  
Three lessons from the household duties test as a form of conditionality  
 
HNCIP was a benefit of its time, although already anachronistic in the 1970s. It was 
introduced to the world at a time when both the women’s movement and the disability 
movement were gaining strength and when prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of 
gender was becoming established as standard practice across Europe. Ironically the 
legislation introducing HNCIP was passed in the same year as the Sex Discrimination Act 
1975. Ann Oakley’s ground breaking research on the sociology of housework was published 
in 1974 69 and the Union of Physical Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) statement 
‘Principles of Disability’, often described as the start of the disability movement in the UK, 
was published in 1976.70 HNCIP was introduced at a time when most of the assumptions 
behind it were being challenged by these movements.  
There are three lessons which we can learn from HNCIP which are relevant to social security 
today: that category conditionality can be as important in excluding people from entitlement 
to financial support as behavioural conditionality; that category conditionality can lead to 
equally humiliating and degrading assessments; and that assumptions about what is ‘normal’ 
are heavily constructed by social assumptions about people’s lives. 
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Writers such as Adler, Dwyer and Wright, and Watts and Fitzpatrick71 are justified in 
focussing on behavioural conditionality in social security. The introduction of work-seeking 
conditionality in Employment and Support Allowance and other benefits, along with the 
intrusive regimes required to enforce these policies, are  signs of an increasingly disciplinary 
state. It is important however that we also pay attention to the more invisible category and 
circumstance conditions which can be equally powerful in regulating people’s behaviour and 
denying an adequate income to those who do not conform. Disabled people are used to the 
humiliating assessments required to qualify for disability benefits, where claimants are 
required to subject themselves to the ‘medical gaze’72 of medical assessors. The particular 
gendered humiliation of married women being forced to ‘admit’ that they were unable to 
keep their houses clean or to feed their husbands and children to an imagined acceptable 
standard, was particular to its time but similarly intrusive assessments continue today. 
Today’s assessment processes for benefits such as ESA, DLA and PIP require claimants to 
show that they are unable to carry out a wide range of often very personal activities, 
involving increasingly intrusive investigations into their daily lives.73 Even where there is no 
explicit behavioural conditionality in these benefits, there is an expectation of claimants’ 
willingness to subject themselves to these humiliating assessments in order to qualify for 
financial support.  
Assumptions about what is normal are heavily constructed by social assumptions about 
people’s lives 
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The original White Paper on NCIP and the DHSS report in 1983 used the language of 
‘choice’ in describing different groups of disabled women and their possible entitlement to 
financial support. These documents suggested that married women chose to marry, chose to 
be financially dependent and chose not to work in the labour market. Furthermore, those who 
worked in the labour market chose to work part-time or chose not to pay full national 
insurance contributions. While some women may have made these choices, knowing the 
impact this might have on their future benefit entitlement, many more would not.74 Even for 
those who understood the complexities of the social security system, women’s labour market 
participation in the 1970s, and today, is not a matter of individual choice but a construction of 
gendered expectations in family life.75  
The attempt to divide women into the three categories of deservingness described in the 
DHSS report of 1983 assumed that women’s participation in the labour market (or not) was a 
matter of choice, for which they must bear the consequences. So women who did not have 
control over this choice were the ‘most deserving’, compared with those who had been able 
to make choices over their work and household composition. In making these distinctions, the 
report took no account of the structural factors which lead women (and men) to make choices 
about work and care. Young disabled people (men and women) were assumed to be 
deserving because they could not be expected to find work in the labour market. Benefits 
such as NCIP, SDA and the young people’s exemptions in Incapacity Benefit, contributed to 
this deservingness discourse, while disability studies scholars have shown that this group of 
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people experienced ‘systematic marginalisation’ from the labour market.76 The expectation 
within HNCIP that young disabled women who chose to marry, knowing that they might not 
be able to fulfil the ‘normal’ duties of a housewife were considered to be deserving of 
benefit, not because they had been excluded from the labour market but because their 
households would have to carry the financial burden of paying for domestic help. Similarly, 
women who chose to marry and not to work in the labour market but who then became 
disabled in later life, were considered deserving because their ‘choice’ to be housewives had 
been thwarted by their acquired disability. These two groups of women were not at fault. On 
the other hand women who had married but continued to work in the labour market, although 
with inadequate national insurance contributions, were considered to be at fault because of 
their failure to anticipate the possibility of becoming disabled. There might be some validity 
to this argument, were it not for the fact that men and single women were not subjected to 
this test of deservingness. The fact that this test of deservingness was also applied to 
unmarried but cohabiting women, simply on the basis of their assumed financial dependence 
on their male partners seems even less convincing. If men or single women found themselves 
disabled in later life, but had not paid national insurance contributions, perhaps because of a 
disrupted work pattern, they were entitled to NCIP. The perceived difference in 
deservingness between these married and cohabiting women and men and single women was 
wholly concerned with the social construction of gender roles. 
The gendered assumption behind HNCIP, that married women chose to be financially 
dependent on their husbands, was only half of the equation. The other half was that married 
and cohabiting women were solely responsible for household tasks. The note in the advice to 
doctors that ‘adolescent daughters’ might be expected to contribute to the household work 
(but not sons or husbands) shows the depth of the gendered assumptions built into the 
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scheme. We might imagine that these two important assumptions about married women’s 
choices (and the subsequent choices of men and adolescent children for that matter) would be 
unlikely to be built into social security policy in quite this explicit way today but they are an 
important reminder that assumptions about what is ‘normal’ in people’s life choices can have 
significant consequences for the ways in which benefits rules are devised.  
More recent social security policies provide examples of this, for example the assumptions in 
Universal Credit that making benefit payment patterns more ‘like work’ would prepare 
people for the labour market77 or that people would restrict the number of children they have 
as a result of the ‘two child’ rule in means-tested benefits. The two-child rule has been 
described as 'the most significant violation of human rights that has yet been written into the 
fabric of the UK social security system'.78 O’Brien argues this on the basis of the rule’s 
implications for children. The so-called ‘rape clause’ provides an exemption to the two child 
limit if a child is conceived as a result of rape. This assumes that, in all other circumstances, 
women are responsible for controlling their own fertility. The assumptions behind the two 
child rule are a crucial reminder that we should not be complacent regarding the 
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